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Abstract. The usual mechanism for modeling learning in spatially structured evolutionary games has to
date been imitation of some successful neighbor. However, it seems natural that individuals hesitate to
imitate their neighbor’s acts, specially if they can imply high costs. Here we study the effect of incorporating
resistance to imitation on these models. Our framework is the spatial Continuous Prisoner’s Dilemma. For
this evolutionary game, it has been reported that occasional errors in the imitation process can explain the
emergence of cooperation from a non-cooperative initial state. In this work, we show that this only occurs
for particular regimes of low costs of cooperation. Furthermore, we display how resistance gets greater
the range of scenarios where cooperative individuals can invade selfish populations. In this context, where
resistance to imitation can be interpreted as a general rule of gradual learning, our results show that the
less that is learnt in a single step from a successful neighbors, the larger the degree of global cooperation
finally attained. In general, the effect of step-by-step learning can be more efficient for the evolution of
cooperation than a full blast one.
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1 Introduction
The evolution of cooperation has been a challenging prob-
lem since Darwin [1–5]. With sophisticated tools of game
2 Jime´nez et al.: Gradual learning and cooperation
theory, researchers from many fields have attempted to
shed light on the underlying mechanisms that outperform
the vulnerability of cooperation of being cheated [6]. Mod-
els with spatial structures have been considered by these
researches to mimic real population where individuals do
not interact with everybody else. In these models, individ-
uals are located on the nodes of a network, play repeatedly
with their neighbors, and update their strategies by imi-
tating (with occasional errors) the strategy of some more
successful neighbor. Different update rules respond to the
same evolutionary principle of reproduction of successful
strategies [7] and are usually implemented through two
basic operators: Selection, in which individuals identify
whom to imitate, and mutation, occasional errors in the
imitation process.
Discrete-choice models, where cooperation is all or noth-
ing, do not lead mutation to generating new strategies
into the population. However in models in which individ-
uals can exhibit variable degrees of cooperation, muta-
tion can be certainly a source of generating diversity. The
study of cooperative behavior in a quantitative way rather
than a qualitative way has been crucial in dealing with the
problem of evolution and the stability of cooperation. The
first studies on this issue [8,9] considered the evolution of
degrees of cooperation by interpolating payoffs between
the discrete outcomes of the classical Prisoner’s Dilemma
model (PD). A natural approach to model variable lev-
els of cooperation was introduced later [10,11]. Iteration
and spatial structures based on continuous cooperative in-
vestment have also been addressed [12–19], [20,21] provide
a complete review of previous researches on the stability
in cooperation in variable-investment systems. Develop-
ing some of the ideas of [10], and following the classical
scheme of [22] for spatial evolutionary games, Killingback
et al. [12] introduced the spatial Continuous Prisioner’s
Dilemma (CPD). The joint consideration of continuous co-
operative investments and spatial structured populations
in their model represents an important advance in explain-
ing the evolutionary origin of cooperation [21].
The strategy update rule considered in [22] was orig-
inally designed for the discrete PD, where exact imita-
tion is the only way to update strategies. In a social and
economic context, where imitation is interpreted as learn-
ing [19], it seems natural that individuals hesitate to im-
itate exactly the investment of a neighbor. In this work
we investigate the effect of introducing some grade of re-
sistance to imitation in the spatial CPD. This resistance
leads to a process in which individuals learn step by step
from their successful neighbors. For this purpose we em-
ploy the most elemental rule that can be used: Each in-
dividual updates her investment by averaging her current
investment with the investment of her successful neigh-
bor. In adverse conditions in which costs for cooperation
are high, individuals have reason to avoid the blind imi-
tation of higher-investors, despite how successful they can
be. Counter-intuitively, we show that this wariness leads
partial learning to being more efficient than a full blast
imitation precisely in regimes of non-low costs of coop-
eration. The paper is organized as follows: In section 2,
we review the spatial CPD as well as we introduce gen-
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eral assumptions and the notation used throughout the
paper. In section 3, we characterize the different payoff
regimes according to the asymptotic behavior of the spa-
tial CPD. In particular, we prove that previous results
[12,?] in which it is reported that cooperation gradually
increases from a non-cooperative state correspond to par-
ticular payoff regimes that we classify as regimes of low
cost. In section 4, we introduce resistance to imitation and
explain how this mechanism operates for the maintenance
and promotion of cooperation. We also provide the condi-
tions in which higher-investment individuals can invade a
population of selfish individuals. Section 5 summaries our
conclusions.
2 The CPD in spatially structured
populations
In the CPD, if an individual, who invests x, interacts
with another, who invests y, the former receives a payoff
equal to S(x, y) = B(y) − C(x) and the latter S(y, x) =
B(x)− C(y). The function B(·) specifies the benefit that
an individual obtains from the investment made by the
other in their pairwise interaction, and the function C(·)
specifies the cost incurred by her. As standard assump-
tions, functions B(·) and C(·) are increasing and concave,
with B(0) = C(0) = 0, and B(x) ≥ C(x) for any feasi-
ble investment x [21]. In order to determine the maximal
possible investment, it is required to compute the optimal
mutual investment xmax that maximizes B(x)−C(x). In
general, for all 0 < x < y < xmax, one can verify the
inequalities shown by [12]
S(y, x) < S(x, x) < S(y, y) < S(x, y), (1)
which are continuous versions of the well known conditions
for the payoffs of the classical Prisoner’s Dilemma [17].
To avoid the problem of comparing investments in dif-
ferent scales, we only consider investments in [0,1]. For
that, it is sufficient to have xmax ≥ 1, therefore (1) holds
for any pair of investments 0 < x < y < 1.
Although the main results of this work cover general
increasing-concave functions, the simulations shown through-
out this paper are based on linear costs, namely, C(x) =
Cx, and benefit functions of the formB(x) = a[1−exp(−bx)],
with a, b > 0. These functions are typical of what might
be expected in real biological situations [23,24] and are ba-
sis functions in the literature of the CPD [12,17,19]. For
these basis functions, one has xmax = − log(C/(ab))/b,
thus, xmax ≥ 1 if and only if C < ab exp(−b). In our para-
metric analysis, we fix a and b and vary C between 0 and
ab exp(−b). One additional remark:
a
(
1− exp−bx)→ Bx, (2)
when b → 0+ and a → +∞, with ab → B < ∞. In fact,
for any investment 0 < x < 1, the convergence is very fast.
Therefore, linear benefit functions, used by [13,14], are an
interesting limit case of the basis functions and, because of
their simplicity, are especially considered in our analysis.
In the spatial CPD, individuals are placed on the nodes
of a network and recollect payoffs from their pairwise in-
teractions with their neighbors accordingly with a CPD.
The total payoff of each individual is given by the sum of
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these payoffs. At each time step, each individual updates
her investment by imitating the investment of her neigh-
bor (including herself) with the highest total payoff. Addi-
tionally, and this is an important ingredient in the model,
[12] consider occasional errors at the imitation moment
(mutations) that can change the investment. It is clear
that mutation and limited local interactions are crucial in
promoting (even to keep) cooperation in the spatial CPD.
In fact, if each individual interacts with the whole popula-
tion and there is no mutation, in the next step, each indi-
vidual always will invest the lowest value from the initial
generation. However, as occurs in the standard Prisoner’s
Dilemma on regular networks [21,25], we argue for the spa-
tial CPD that the spatial structure is capable of sustaining
cooperation only in limited cost/benefit regimes. To study
this issue, we consider the spatial CPD on a square lattice
with periodic boundary conditions, with individuals in-
teracting with their four nearest neighbors (von Neumann
neighborhood) and synchronous updating.
3 Asymptotics for different cost regimes
Let us analyze the evolution of the social network defined
in Section 2 in the simplest scenario. First, we consider
an initial condition with a single individual that invests
x < y in a group of y-individuals (individuals who invest
y) and assume no mutations. In that case, the update
rule is deterministic and we can compute analytically the
evolution of the system. More precisely:
(i) If C(y)− C(x) < (B(y)−B(x))/4, the x-individual
invades only its four nearest neighbors.
(ii) If (B(y)−B(x))/4 < C(y)−C(x) < (B(y)−B(x))/2,
the x-individual spreads over the lattice, reaching
a structure with the same shape of the cross with
sawtooth boundaries showed by [25].
(iii) If C(y)− C(x) > (B(y)−B(x))/2, the x-individual
spreads until the extinction of the y-individuals.
Assuming that cost and benefit are differentiable func-
tions, and using the fact that they are increasing and con-
cave, it is easy to establish
C ′(1)
B′(0)
<
C(y)− C(x)
B(y)−B(x) <
C ′(0)
B′(1)
, (3)
for all 0 < x < y < 1. Thus, the quotients C ′(1)/B′(0) and
C ′(0)/B′(1) provide sufficient and necessary conditions,
regardless of the values x and y, to determine which ab-
sorbing state is reached. For all 0 < x < y < 1, from
a lattice of y-individuals, except one who that invests
x, the condition C ′(0) > B′(1)/4 is necessary for the
spread over all the lattice of the smallest investment and
the condition C ′(1) > B′(0)/4 is sufficient. Additionally,
C ′(1) > B′(0)/2 is sufficient for the extinction of the high-
est investment. In our study, we discriminate accordingly
the different payoff regimes:
– Low cost, when C ′(0) < B′(1)/4.
– Low-medium cost, if B′(1)/4 < C ′(0) and C ′(1) <
B′(0)/4.
– High-medium cost, if C ′(1) > B′(0)/4.
– High cost, if C ′(1) > B′(0)/2.
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For simplicity, sometimes we will not distinguish between
low-medium and high-medium costs and we refer to both
as medium costs. Notice that if the benefit is a linear func-
tion, namely B(x) = Bx, the only low-medium cost is the
linear function Cx, with C = B/4. In that case, B/4 and
B/2 are threshold values to determine the region of low,
medium and high costs.
3.1 Asymptotics from random initial conditions
without mutation
If a lower-investing individual spreads into a lattice of
higher-investing individuals), two lower-investing individ-
uals do the same. Furthermore, for high-medium costs, if
there are different low investments into a lattice of higher-
investing individuals, at least the lowest spreads over the
whole system and other low investments can locally do
the same. If the initial investments are randomly chosen,
the previous argument, and the fact that investments are
initially well-mixed on the network, allow us to conjecture
that high-medium cost is sufficient for the spreading of
lower investments from random initial conditions. On the
other hand, as we argued above, at high costs the smallest
investment always dominates the network. In contrast, if
the cost is low, the small investments do not spread on
the system and limited local interactions of the lattice
are capable of maintaining cooperation. If the cost is low-
medium, we do not provide arguments for determining the
asymptotic behavior of the system from a random initial
condition. For this reason, it is advisable to first take a
look at the linear benefit case, where low-medium costs
are reduced only to one threshold value.
The type of social network that we are studying typ-
ically reaches a steady state where the mean investment
lightly fluctuates around a value, called the asymptotic
mean investment [17,19]. Thus, the promotion or sustain-
ing of cooperation can be contrasted by comparing the
asymptotic mean investment with the initial one. Figure 1
shows the typical evolution in time of the mean invest-
ment as well as the investment configuration at the steady
state for the different cost regimes. For this illustration,
we considered the same random initial configuration, uni-
formly distributed on [0, 1] random variables placed on
the 100 × 100 lattice. For low costs, the figure displays
the previously reported clusterization of high investments
and consequent promotion of cooperation. However, the
figure also illustrates the spread of small investments for
medium cost regimes as well as the domination of the low-
est for high costs. That is, the square lattice is only ca-
pable of promoting (even sustaining) cooperation in low
cost regimes.
To have an overview of the asymptotic behavior of the
investments for different costs we considered different ba-
sis functions and varied the cost along its range. For each
parametric set, we perform simulations for 100 initial ran-
dom configurations until the steady state. Although the
asymptotic mean investment depends on the initial con-
dition, we noted that its slope, in terms of the cost, is
strongly independent. For this reason, we use the aver-
age, over the initial random conditions, as a smooth in-
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Fig. 1. Time series of mean investments and configuration of the lattices at the steady state for linear benefit and low (solid
lines), medium (dashed lines) and high (bottom solid line) costs, from the same random initial investments. The figure illustrates
the typical behavior close to the threshold costs and in the middle values. The top solid lines and the first three snapshots
correspond, respectively, to low costs, {δ, 1
8
B, 1
4
B − δ}, with δ = B/1000. The dashed lines and the last three snapshots to
medium costs { 1
4
B + δ, 3
8
B, 1
2
B − δ}. The bottom solid line corresponds to high cost 1
2
B + δ (its snapshot at the steady state
is omitted, a complete black square). The gray scale used to represent the investments on the lattice is linear between black =
0 and white =1.
dicator of the relation between costs and the asymptotic
mean investment. The slope for four illustrative cases are
displayed in Figure 2. We remark that for costs above
the threshold cost B′(0)/2 = ab/2 the lowest investment
dominates the network from any random initial condi-
tions. Note that the transition between significant high
asymptotic levels of cooperation to low levels occurs in
low-medium costs, namely B′(1)/4 < C < B′(0)/4. This
transition is discontinuous if the benefit is the linear func-
tion Bx. In that case, the phase transition occurs at the
threshold cost B/4. The bifurcation of the mean invest-
ment time series around this critical cost can be observed
0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
Cost
a
sy
m
pt
ot
ic 
m
ea
n 
in
ve
st
m
en
t
Fig. 2. Asymptotic mean investment as function of the cost.
The left solid line corresponds to the linear benefit B(x) = x
and the right one to B(x) = 8x/5. Left dashed line corresponds
to the benefit function B(x) = 5(1−exp(−2x/9)) and the right
one to B(x) = 8(1− exp(−2x/9)).
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in Fig. 1, by comparing the resulting time series for costs
B/4− δ and B/4− δ, with small δ.
3.2 Asymptotic from small initial investment with
mutation
The mutation mechanism introduced by [12] corresponds
to neutral variations in the investment pool. Specifically,
they consider normal errors, at the imitation moment,
with variance equal to 10% of the expected investment.
Without mutation, the mean investment of the network
remains into the range of the initial investments. The
main result of [12] is that starting from arbitrary low in-
vestments, occasional mutations can increase the mean in-
vestment to significant levels, after a long runtime. Their
simulations are based on a parametric set that we have
characterized as low cost. Namely, B(x) = 8(1−exp(−x)),
C(x) = 0.7x, and xmax ≈ 2.4361. Performing simulations
with the same mutation rate per individual (1/100) and
modeling errors in the same way, we confirm their main
result for any low cost, when the benefit function is not lin-
ear. Moreover, we are now prepared to explain why muta-
tion raises cooperation for this cost/benefit regime: When
costs are low, our results show that negative mutations
(i.e. mutations with lower investments than their expec-
tations) do not spread on the system and that higher-
investing clusters invade lower-investment ones. To see
this, notice that individuals in the boundaries of the higher-
investing cluster outperform the individuals in the bound-
aries of the lower-investing cluster. On the other hand,
interactions with eventual positive mutations (mutations
with investments higher than their expectations) can give
origin to a small cluster of higher investments, again in the
low cost regime. For a strictly concave benefit function,
the lower the investment the higher the additional payoff
that a positive mutant adds to their neighbors. Addition-
ally, the more concave the benefit function is, the stronger
such effect is. To sum up, in this unbeatable cost/benefit
framework (e.g. low cost and very concave benefit func-
tion), a positive mutant can gradually invade a world of
low investors until obtaining a high mean investment at
the steady state. However, the less concave the benefit
function is the lower the mean investment reached is. This
pattern coincides with the results of [18], who analyze dif-
ferent regimes of physiological costs in a related adaptive
dynamics with the CPD. Our results complement the anal-
ysis for lattice-structured population. In fact:
1. If the benefit is linear, the lattice-structured popula-
tion is only capable of sustaining the mean investment
around the initial one, even if the cost is low.
When significant costs are considered, other asymptotic
results occur:
2. If the cost is low-medium, for any basis benefit function
(linear or strictly concave), the lattice is only capable
of sustaining the mean investment around the initial
one. This occurs with and without mutation. A muta-
tion (negative or positive) does not have any effect on
the lattice.
3. In high-medium cost regimes, the mutation mechanism
works against cooperation, by favoring negative muta-
tions (i.e. mutations with lower investments than the
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expectations). Thus, if there are not mutations, the lat-
tice can sustain low levels of cooperation, but cannot
stop the fall of investments if any occasional negative
mutation appears on the lattice.
4. For high costs, the investments nose dive, with or with-
out mutation.
Summarizing, small mutations promote cooperation
only in very particular scenarios of low costs of cooper-
ation.
4 Effects of resistance to imitation on the
evolution of cooperation
The above analysis was obtained when the strategy up-
date rule is based on exact imitation. Now we consider
weighted average as the way to update investments. In-
stead of focal individuals copying the best neighbor, each
individuals updates her investment with a new one “be-
tween” her own investment and the investment of her suc-
cessful neighbor. Into the spatial CPD, weighted average
operates as follows: If an individual invests x and her suc-
cessful neighbor invests y, in the next step, the former will
invest
αx+ (1− α)y (4)
plus a possible error, for some α ∈ [0, 1].
In an economic and social scenario, the parameter α
can be viewed as a factor of resistance to imitation or as a
measure of wariness. When α = 0, there is no resistance,
individuals copy the strategy of their neighbors with the
highest payoff. However, when 0 < α < 1 the individ-
uals gradually learn from their most successful partner.
Whereas if α = 1 individuals refuse to imitate.
4.1 Supporting cooperation in adverse cost regimes
As in Section 3, we analyze first the evolution in time of
the social network without errors in the update rule. Sim-
ilar to the previously studied case, the lattice reaches a
steady state where the mean investment lightly fluctuates
around a constant. Figure 3 shows the typical evolution
in time of the mean investment for different resistance
levels in medium and high costs. It is noteworthy how the
presence of resistance to imitation can increase the asymp-
totic mean investment to higher levels when investments
are costly.
To have a better understanding of the effect of resis-
tance to imitation, we considered different cost/benefit
functions and varied the resistance along its range. For
each parametric set, we performed simulations for 100
initial random configurations until the steady state was
reached. We observe that only small variations on the
asymptotic mean investments were observed. Thus, the
average, over the initial random conditions, is a robust
estimator of this asymptotic mean investment, regardless
the initial condition. In general, in low cost regimes, re-
sistance neither favors cooperation nor dulls it. However,
for any medium or high cost, resistance to exact imita-
tion strongly favors cooperation. Moreover, the higher the
resistance is the larger the mean investment asymptoti-
cally reached. Figure 4 characterizes the behavior for the
different cost regimes. We conclude that cautious learn-
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Fig. 3. Time series of mean investments for medium (a) and
high (b) cost with different resistance degrees. Top solid lines
correspond to α = 0.8, dashed lines to α = 0.2 and bottom
solid line to α = 0. The benefit function is linear, and the costs
considered are to the right of the thresholds 1
4
B and 1
2
B.
ing is more efficient than hasty learning when the cost is
medium or high and it is necessary to sustain cooperation
(even in low levels) for high costs.
To understand how resistance works to favor cooper-
ation in medium/high cost regimes, let us consider again
the simplest initial condition with a single x-individual in
a lattice occupied with y-individuals, with x < y. Notice
that the x-investment spreads on the lattice (or dominates
it) if individuals have no resistance to imitation. For this
initial configuration, let the epicenter be the individual
with initial investment x and the front of the wave be the
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Fig. 4. Asymptotic mean investment as a function of α for
the benefit function Bx. Low costs in (a): top dashed line 1
8
B,
solid line 1
6
B, and bottom dashed line 1
5
B. Medium costs in
(b): top dashed line 1
4
B+δ, solid line 3
10
B, and bottom dashed
line 2
5
B. High costs in (c): top dashed line 1
2
B + δ, solid line
3
5
B, and bottom dashed line 3
4
B. To consider costs close to the
thresholds we make δ = 1/1000.
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Fig. 5. Attenuation of a 0-investor for a pool of 1-investors with low degree of resistance at time generations 10, 20, 100, 300,
1000 and 3000. B(x) = 4(1 − exp(−x/2)), C = 0.8, and α = 0.25. The asymptotic mean investment in the stationary state is
around 0.67. Note: for this parametric set, the 0-invertor dominates the system if there is no resistance.
y-individuals closer to the epicenter. It is easy to show that
while individuals gradually learn from the individual with
the least investment (expansion of the wave), the invest-
ment at the front of the wave of the generation k changes
to y−(1−α)k(y−x) in the next step. Thus, if the lattice is
big enough, there exists a resistance value such that these
individuals at the front of wave learn from their neighbors
with higher investments, in some generation, producing a
reflection of the wave. An immediate consequence of this
result is that the expansive wave generated by the x-agent
is reflected by a barrier of y-individuals when those have
enough resistance. The reflected wave is propagated to-
wards the epicenter making an increment of the mean in-
vestment of the system. Thus, if the lattice is big enough
and individuals have enough resistance to imitation, the
system can asymptotically recover high investments (de-
fection absorption); even if there is not enough resistance
to imitation, the wave can be attenuated producing a di-
minishment in the mean investment (defection attenua-
tion). Moreover, the absorption/attenuation effect, illus-
trated in Figures 5 and 6, can locally operate for random
initial configuration until producing the rebound in the
mean investment evolution showed in Figure 3(a).
4.2 The origin of cooperation: Learning errors and
resistance to imitation
The most amazing results occur when there are occa-
sional errors in the gradual learning rule. To study this
phenomenon, we performed simulations by covering low,
medium and high costs and linear and strictly concave
benefit functions. As in Section 3.2, we considered low ini-
tial investments, uniformly distributed between zero and
1/10, and error rate of 1%, Gaussian distributed with vari-
ance equal to 10% of the expected investment. Our study
is conclusive as to the effect of the resistance to learning:
1. In medium costs (low-medium and high-medium) as
well as in low costs with linear benefits, where the
model with learning errors and without resistance is
only capable of sustaining cooperation in the initial
investment range, gradual learning leads to significant
higher asymptotic mean investment.
2. In high costs, occasional errors work against coopera-
tion and even the resistance to imitation is unable to
maintain cooperation.
Figure 7 shows the typical effect of the resistance to imi-
tation in adverse conditions in which simple mutations in
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Fig. 6. Absorption of a 0-investor for a pool of 1-investors with high enough degree of resistance at time generations 10, 20,
100, 300, 1000 and 3000. B(x) = 4(1− exp(−x/2)), C = 0.8, α = 0.65. The asymptotic mean investment in the stationary state
is almost 1.
the structured population are not sufficient to trigger high
levels of cooperation.
In these scenarios of low and medium costs, with linear
or strictly concave benefits, there always exists a value for
the resistance parameter to raise cooperation to higher
levels. Moreover, we observed through simulations, that
any resistance level (0 < α < 1)) is enough to promote co-
operation when costs are low. Medium levels of resistance
may be required when costs are medium; the closer the
cost is to the high cost threshold, the higher the level of
resistance required.
5 Conclusions
In this paper we have studied the effect on the evolu-
tion of cooperation of introducing resistance to imitation
in the strategy update rule of the spatial CPD. We have
reviewed this evolutionary game in detail when the strat-
egy update rule is based on unconditional imitation. First,
we have studied the model without errors in the imitating
process. For this case, we have found a simple classification
of the payoff regimes (low, low-medium, high-medium, and
high costs) which allows us to determine the asymptotic
mean behavior of a population structured on a square lat-
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Fig. 7. Time series of mean investments with resistance (top
lines) and without resistance (bottom lines): (a) linear benefit
(B = 1), low cost (C = 0.2) and low resistance (α = 0.1). (b)
strictly concave benefit (B(x) = 4[1 − exp(−x/2)]), medium
cost (C = 0.4) and medium resistance (α = 0.5). Gaussian
mutation, with variance equal to 10% of the expected invest-
ment and mutation rate 1%. Initial investments are uniformly
distributed on [0, 1
10
].
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tice. From random initial conditions, the spatial structure
promotes high investments only in low cost regimes. We
observed fast transitions to low mean investments in low-
medium costs. It is interesting to notice that these transi-
tions are discontinuous when the payoffs are linear func-
tions. In regimes of high-medium cost the spatial structure
is unable to keep the initial mean cooperation investment.
The lowest investment in the initial state dominates the
system for any high-cost regime. When occasional errors in
the imitating process are considered, cooperation emerges
from a non-cooperative initial state only under a particu-
lar regime of low cost and strictly concave benefit. To ob-
serve this emergence, previously reported in the literature
of the spatial CPD [12,19], negligible costs of cooperation
[18] are required. For the rest of the regimes, the essential
problem of cooperation remains: Occasional errors have
no effect on the evolution of cooperation when costs are
low and the benefit function is linear or when costs are
low-medium. Moreover, they work against cooperation in
high-medium and high costs.
Weighted average can be viewed as a step-by-step learn-
ing mechanism in the strategy update process that can
prevent individuals from their costly acts. Amazingly, it
is this aspect that offers important insight into the prob-
lem of origin and sustainment of cooperation. Our anal-
ysis explains how cooperation evolves and is maintained
when gradual learning works in the spatial CPD. We have
proved that the resistance to exact imitation has a signif-
icant effect on medium (low-medium and high-medium)
cost and high cost regimes: The less that is learnt in a
single step, the greater the degree of global cooperation
finally attained. When learning errors can occur on an
arbitrarily non-cooperative population, we have showed
that a higher-investment mutant spreads all over the sys-
tem raising cooperation to significant levels in regimes of
low costs (with linear or non-linear benefits) and medium
costs. The larger the cost, the greater the resistance to im-
itation needed in a single step. However, in more adverse
conditions of high costs, occasional errors work against
cooperation and even the resistance is unable to maintain
cooperation.
We call attention to the fact that gradual learning can
be introduced in a straightforward way into the strategy
update rule of any continuous evolutionary game, such as
the continuous Snowdrift game [26] and the spatial ultima-
tum game [27]. Gradual learning can also operate jointly
with different selection mechanisms to identify from whom
to learn. To compare results with previous literature on
spatial the CPD, we have considered learning from the
successful neighbor, but the weighted average operator can
be easily fitted to random selection criterions [7]. We have
only considered weighted average, because it is the natu-
ral rule when strategies are represented by real numbers,
such as cooperative investments. But different schemas of
gradual learning can be considered when strategies are not
scalar. Our formulation is quite simple and can be applied
in a wide range of scenarios. We hope that this work will
contribute to highlighting the relevant role of this evolu-
tionary principle for the study of cooperation.
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In conclusion, resistance to imitation provides a nat-
ural solution to the evolutionary riddle of the origin and
maintenance of cooperation in a world governed by se-
lective forces. Our results suggest that populations which
learn slowly from successful partners are, in the long term,
more efficient in the sense that they allow for higher co-
operative investments. Thus, our model provides an evo-
lutionary version of the tortoise and the hare fable when
the goal is cooperation.
We gratefully thank Vı´ctor Egu´ıluz of IFISC for multiple in-
spiring discussions related to this paper. This work was sup-
ported by MEC (Spain) under grants ECO2008-05080, SEJ2007-
67135 and FISICOS, CSIC (Spain) under grant PIE200750I016,
and EU under grant GABA.
References
1. R. Trivers, Q. Rev. Biol. 46, 35–57 (1971).
2. R. Axelrod, W. D. Hamilton, Science 211, 1390–1396
(1981).
3. J. Maynard, E. Szathma´ry, The Major Transitions in Evo-
lution (Oxford: W. H. Freeman & Co, 1995).
4. L. A.Dugatkin, Cooperation among animals (Oxford Uni-
versity Press, 1997).
5. M. A. Nowak, Science 314, 1560–1563 (2006).
6. E. Pennisi, Science 309, 93 (2005).
7. G. Szabo´, G. Fa´th, Phys. Rep. 446, 97–216 (2007).
8. G. Mar, P. St Denis, Int. J. Bifur. Chaos 4, 943–958 (1994).
9. M. Frean, J. Theor. Biol. 182, 549–559 (1996).
10. M. Doebeli, N. Knowlton, Proc. Natl Acad. Sci. USA 95,
8676–8680 (1998).
11. G. Roberts, T. M. Sherratt, Nature 394, 175–179 (1998).
12. T. Killingback, M. Doebeli, N. Knowlton, Proc. R. Soc.
Lond. B 266, 1723–1728 (1999).
13. L. M. Wahl, M. A. Nowak, J. Theor. Biol. 200, 307–322
(1999).
14. L. M. Wahl, M. A. Nowak, J. Theor. Biol. 200, 323–338
(1999).
15. T. N. Sherratt, G. Roberts, G., J. Theor. Biol. 200, 419–
426 (1999).
16. J. C. Koella, J. C., Proc. R. Soc. Lond. B 267, 1975–1985
(2000).
17. T. Killingback, M. Doebeli, Am. Nat. 160, 421–438 (2002).
18. J. F. Le Gaillard, R. Ferriere, U. Dieckmann, Evolution
57, 1–17 (2003).
19. M. Ifti, T. Killingback, M. Doebeli, J. Theor. Biol. 231,
97–106 (2004).
20. T. N. Sherratt, G. Roberts, J. Theor. Biol. 215, 47–56
(2002).
21. M. Doebeli, C. Hauert, Ecol. Lett. 8, 748–766 (2005).
22. M. A. Nowak, R. M. May, Nature 415, 424–426 (1992).
23. G. S. Wilkinson, Nature 308, 181–184 (1984).
24. B. Hart, L. Hart, Anim. Behav. 44, 10731083 (1992).
25. R. Jime´nez, H. Lugo, J. Cuesta, A. Sa´nchez, J. Theor. Biol.
J. 250, 475-483 (2008).
26. M. Doebeli, C. Hauert, T. Killingback, Science 303, 859–
862 (2004).
27. K. M. Page, M. A. Nowak, K. Sigmund, Proc. R. Soc.
Lond. B 267, 2177–2182 (2000).
